Allanfa Gyflym
Rydym yn defnyddio rhai cwcis hanfodol i wneud i’n gwefan weithio. Hoffem osod cwcis ychwanegol fel y gallwn gofio eich dewisiadau a deall sut rydych yn defnyddio ein gwefan.
Gallwch reoli eich dewisiadau a gosodiadau cwcis unrhyw bryd drwy glicio ar “Addasu cwcis” isod. I gael rhagor o wybodaeth am sut rydym yn defnyddio cwcis, gweler ein Hysbysiad cwcis.
Mae eich dewisiadau cwcis wedi’u cadw. Gallwch ddiweddaru eich gosodiadau cwcis unrhyw bryd ar y dudalen cwcis.
Mae eich dewisiadau cwcis wedi’u cadw. Gallwch ddiweddaru eich gosodiadau cwcis unrhyw bryd ar y dudalen cwcis.
Mae’n ddrwg gennym, roedd problem dechnegol. Rhowch gynnig arall arni.
Diolch am roi cynnig ar fersiwn 'beta' ein gwefan newydd. Mae'n waith ar y gweill, byddwn yn ychwanegu gwasanaethau newydd dros yr wythnosau nesaf, felly cymerwch gip a gadewch i ni wybod beth yw eich barn chi.
SECTION 1 — CORE TELEPHONY PLATFORM
Q1. What telephony platform(s) does the force currently use? (e.g.
Avaya, Mitel, Cisco, Microsoft Teams, other — please name the product and version where known)
Q2. Are these systems hosted on-premise, in a private cloud, or in a public cloud environment?
Q3. Who is the primary supplier/integrator responsible for delivering and supporting the telephony platform?
Q4. When do the contracts expire (month and year)? and are there plans for a new tender
SECTION 2 — CONTACT CENTRE / 999 AND 101 HANDLING
Q5. What platform is used for your force contact operations centre (handling 999 and 101 calls)? (e.g. Avaya Aura Contact Centre, Genesys, NICE CXone, other)
Q6. What Session Border Controller (SBC) product is used to connect your SIP trunks to the public network? (e.g. Oracle/Acme Packet, Avaya SBCE, Cisco CUBE, AudioCodes)
Q7. What workforce management system is used (if any)?
Q8. What call recording system is in use within the contact centre?
(e.g. NICE, Verint, Redbox etc)
SECTION 3 — UNIFIED COMMUNICATIONS AND WIDER INFRASTRUCTURE
Q9. A) Does the force use Microsoft Teams for internal communications? B) If so, is Teams also used for any telephony (Direct Routing or Operator Connect)?
Q10. What Integrated Communications Control System (ICCS) is in use in the force control room? (e.g. Frequentis, Zetron, other)
Q11. What is the procurement route used for telephony and communications contracts? (e.g. Crown Commercial Service framework, direct award, open tender, regional collaboration)
SECTION 4 — REFRESH AND PIPELINE
Q12. Are there any active or planned procurements for replacement or upgrade of the telephony or contact centre platform in the next 24 months?
South Wales Police do hold some information in relation to this request.
Questions 1, 2, 5, 6, 8 and 10
In relation to this part of your request the following exemptions apply:
Section 24(1) - National Security
Section 31(1)(a)(b) – Law Enforcement
Section 24 and Section 31 are both qualified, prejudice-based exemptions and the legislators accept that there may be harm if released. The authority is therefore required to articulate the harm that may be caused and consider the public interest arguments for and against the disclosure of the information.
Evidence of Harm
Every effort should be made to release information under Freedom of Information. However, a FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) response is considered to be a release to the world as once the information is published the public authority have no control over what use is made of that information.
The Police Service is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve. To achieve these objectives all forces have a telephony and communications network infrastructure to support the vital information technology essential to front line services. Disclosure of specific IT services, capabilities, or the lack thereof, in concert with any formal acknowledgement of strategic deficiency would reveal intricacies of those systems thereby highlighting vulnerabilities and compromising individual force information assurance.
In terms of duty of care, this would be detrimental to the public at large as disclosure could assist a malicious actor by highlighting vulnerable forces and leaving those forces open to disruption of Information Technology systems; thus compromising the effective delivery of operational law enforcement which in turn, is met by an increase of criminal offending.
Public Interest Test
Factors favouring disclosure - Providing information in respect of South Wales Police (SWP) network infrastructure would allow the public to be better informed on the health state and performance of said Information Technology platform. In addition, forces are required to demonstrate efficient services to local taxpayers and satisfy audit requirements. This would provide transparency with regard to the use of public funds in so much as highlighting that funds are being used to correctly and appropriately ensure all forces have adequate infrastructure, which results in the smooth running of force Technology systems.
Factors favouring non-disclosure - Whilst there is public interest in providing reassurance that police forces are appropriately and effectively dealing with any threats posed by terrorist organisations against police force Technology capabilities, there is a strong public interest in safeguarding National Security and the welfare and safety of the general public at large. Any disclosure has the potential to undermine current and future data integrity, which in turn compromises the force’s mandate to protect the security of the United Kingdom, e.g. counter-terrorism activity. The risk of significant harm or even death to the community at large would be increased. Any disclosure of information that may lead to compromise of force IT systems which ultimately affects law enforcement capabilities and hinders the prevention and detection of crime or terrorism, is not in the interest of the public.
Balance Test
The security of the country is of paramount importance, and the Police service will not divulge any information if to do so would undermine law enforcement and therefore compromise the work of the police service. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing and force infrastructure, including any initiatives conducted with the private sector in relation to impacting on the crime or terrorist threat, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of these arrangements in this very sensitive area.
The points above highlight the merits for and against disclosure of the requested information. Disclosure would undoubtedly provide a greater openness and transparency to the community at large with regard to the Information Technology resources available to the police, and whilst there is always a public interest in the transparency of how a police force delivers effective law enforcement and ensures the National Security of the United Kingdom is robust, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding the intricacies and tactical capabilities of the systems used when dealing with information.
In every case, public safety is the paramount focus and any information which would place individuals at risk and compromise the National Security of the United Kingdom, no matter how generic, is not in the public interest. The effective delivery of operational law enforcement and the National Security of the United Kingdom is crucial and of paramount importance to every force. This would have a negative impact on law enforcement and national security.
Question 3
South Wales Police (SWP)
Question 4
No information held
Question 7
GRS
Question 9a
Yes
Question 9b
No
Question 11
Crown Commercial Service Framework
Question 12
No information held