Allanfa Gyflym
Rydym yn defnyddio rhai cwcis hanfodol i wneud i’n gwefan weithio. Hoffem osod cwcis ychwanegol fel y gallwn gofio eich dewisiadau a deall sut rydych yn defnyddio ein gwefan.
Gallwch reoli eich dewisiadau a gosodiadau cwcis unrhyw bryd drwy glicio ar “Addasu cwcis” isod. I gael rhagor o wybodaeth am sut rydym yn defnyddio cwcis, gweler ein Hysbysiad cwcis.
Mae eich dewisiadau cwcis wedi’u cadw. Gallwch ddiweddaru eich gosodiadau cwcis unrhyw bryd ar y dudalen cwcis.
Mae eich dewisiadau cwcis wedi’u cadw. Gallwch ddiweddaru eich gosodiadau cwcis unrhyw bryd ar y dudalen cwcis.
Mae’n ddrwg gennym, roedd problem dechnegol. Rhowch gynnig arall arni.
Diolch am roi cynnig ar fersiwn 'beta' ein gwefan newydd. Mae'n waith ar y gweill, byddwn yn ychwanegu gwasanaethau newydd dros yr wythnosau nesaf, felly cymerwch gip a gadewch i ni wybod beth yw eich barn chi.
Question 1
South Wales Police do not hold information in relation to question 1. Policy documents are not held at a local Force level.
Outside of the Freedom of Information Act, please see below link for national Prevent guidance:
224-2023---ctp-prevent-policy-2020-ctnet-v3.6_redacted.pdf
Question 2
We have considered your request for information, and we are not obliged to supply this information. The following exemptions apply:
Section 24(1) National Security
Section 31(1) Law Enforcement
Sections 24 and 31 are qualified, prejudice-based exemptions and the legislators accept that there may be harm if released. The authority is therefore required to articulate the harm that may be caused and consider the public interest arguments for and against the disclosure of the information.
Overall Harm (Sections 24(1) and 31(1))
Disclosure of the requested information would be likely to cause prejudice by revealing information about the scale and frequency of Police Led Partnerships connected to Prevent activity at a force level over time. Although the request seeks numerical totals only, the provision of cumulative and annual figures would enable trends, increases or decreases in activity to be identified. In the context of Prevent and counter terrorism safeguarding, such trend information is inherently sensitive.
There is a real and significant likelihood that this information, when combined with other material already available in the public domain, would contribute to a mosaic effect. This would allow informed individuals to draw inferences about policing focus, operational capacity, prioritisation and the intensity of safeguarding activity linked to counter terrorism functions. Those seeking to avoid police engagement or undermine Prevent activity could use this information to adapt their behaviour, delay engagement, or test perceived thresholds for intervention.
Prevent operates as part of the UK’s wider counter terrorism framework under CONTEST and relies on early identification, confidential information sharing and effective multi agency cooperation. Disclosure of force level activity data over time would be likely to undermine the effectiveness of these arrangements by increasing understanding of how police led safeguarding is applied in practice. This would prejudice the prevention and detection of crime and, given the counter terrorism context, would also be likely to prejudice national security by reducing the effectiveness of protective policing measures designed to manage risk before it escalates into criminality.
Public Interest Test
Sections 24(1) and 31(1)
Factors favouring disclosure - Disclosure would promote transparency and accountability by demonstrating, at a high level, how Police Led Partnerships have been used by the force over time. It would contribute to public understanding of Prevent related safeguarding activity and provide reassurance that mechanisms exist to identify and manage risk as part of policing’s role in counter terrorism and public protection.
Factors favouring non-disclosure - Prevent activity directly supports national security and the prevention and detection of crime by identifying and managing individuals vulnerable to radicalisation before criminal thresholds are reached. Disclosure of force level cumulative and annual totals would enable analysis of trends and changes in activity, which could be used to infer operational focus, capability or effectiveness. This information could assist those seeking to avoid intervention or exploit safeguarding processes, thereby undermining law enforcement activity, damaging multi agency working, and reducing the ability of policing and partners to protect vulnerable individuals and the public.
Balance Test
In balancing the public interest, while there is a recognised benefit in transparency and public understanding of policing and safeguarding activity, this is outweighed by the strong and enduring public interest in protecting national security and the effective functioning of law enforcement. Disclosure of force level totals over time would be likely to cause harm by enabling inferences to be drawn about counter terrorism safeguarding activity, operational emphasis and capacity. Given the sensitivity of Prevent activity and its direct connection to national security and the prevention of crime, the public interest favours maintaining the exemptions under sections 24(1) and 31(1).