FOI 533/26
Request
- Policies and governance
(a) Copies of all policies, standard operating procedures, guidance documents, or directives — whether issued at force level or adopted from national guidance — that govern the use of generative AI tools by officers or staff, in force since 1 January 2023.
(b) If no such policy or guidance exists, please confirm this.
- Risk assessments and compliance
(a) Copies of any Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) completed in relation to the use of generative AI tools by officers or staff for any purpose, including administrative, investigative, or operational tasks.
(b) If no DPIA has been completed for any generative AI tool, please confirm this.
- Deployed tools and licensing
(a) A list of any generative AI tools (including products bundled within existing software suites, such as Microsoft Copilot within Microsoft 365) that have been made available to officers or staff, and the date from which each tool was made available.
(b) Whether access to any generative AI tool has been suspended or restricted since 1 January 2023, and if so, which tool, on what date, and any recorded reason for the suspension or restriction.
- Training
(a) Whether any training, e-learning, briefing, or written guidance on the use, limitations, or risks of generative AI tools has been provided to officers or staff, and if so, the date it was first made available.
(b) Whether completion of such training is mandatory before officers or staff may use generative AI tools, or whether it is optional or advisory.
(c) The number of officers and staff who have completed such training, if this figure is recorded, and the total number of officers and staff who currently have access to one or more generative AI tools.
(d) If no training has been provided, please confirm this.
- Incident recording and quality assurance
(a) The number of occasions, if recorded, on which output from a generative AI tool used by officers or staff was subsequently identified as containing factual inaccuracies, fabricated information, or material errors — whether identified internally or by an external party — since 1 January 2023.
(b) If no such records are held, please confirm this.
- Audits and reviews
(a) Copies of any audit, review, or evaluation — whether conducted internally or by an external body — of the force's use of generative AI tools.
(b) If no audit or review has been conducted, please confirm this.
Response
Question 1, 2, 3 and 6
As this is available in the public domain, we are therefore not obliged to provide this information as the following exemption applies:
Section 21 – Information Accessible by Other Means.
This is an absolute, class-based exemption which means that a public authority is not required to consider the public interest in disclosure.
Under Section 16, the duty to provide advice and assistance, please see the below link:
Published items | South Wales Police
Question 4
- South Wales Police has an Artificial Intelligence (AI) Policy and supporting guidance on the appropriate use of AI tools. Guidance covering the use, limitations, risks and best-practice application of AI was first issued in February 2026.
- The AI Policy and supporting guidance apply to all officers and staff. Users of AI tools are required to comply with the force's policy and guidance when using such technologies.
- South Wales Police does not hold recorded information regarding:
- The number of officers and staff who have completed AI-related training or guidance; or
- The total number of officers and staff who currently have access to one or more generative AI tools.
Therefore, this information is not held for the purposes of the Freedom of Information Act 2000.
Question 5
(a) & (b) South Wales Police does not hold records regarding occasions where output generated by an AI tool was subsequently identified as containing factual inaccuracies, fabricated information, or material errors, whether identified internally or by an external party.
Therefore, this information is not held for the purposes of the Freedom of Information Act 2000.
In addition with regards to question 4 and 5, South Wales Police neither confirm nor deny whether any training has been provided that relates specifically to counter terrorism (CT), SoC (Serious and Organised Crime), covert intelligence or specialist digital forensics, or whether any such records exist in relation to generative AI used within CT, SoC, covert intelligence or specialist digital forensics, under the following exemptions:
Section 24(2) (National Security)
Section 31(3) (Law Enforcement)
Section 24 Section and 31 are qualified, prejudice-based exemptions and the legislators accept that there may be harm if released. The authority is therefore required to articulate the harm that may be caused and consider the public interest arguments for and against the disclosure of information.
Overall Harm
Having disclosed high‑level information about routine, non‑sensitive uses of Artificial Intelligence (AI), South Wales Police will neither confirm nor deny whether it holds any further information that would indicate whether AI is, or is not, used in connection with CT, SoC, covert intelligence or specialist digital forensics supporting those functions. The duty to confirm or deny is disapplied by virtue of sections 24(2) (National Security) and 31(3) (Law Enforcement) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000. This response should not be taken as an indication of whether any additional information is held.
Confirming or denying whether AI is used by South Wales Police in c CT, SoC, covert intelligence or specialist digital forensics would enable hostile actors to infer the presence, absence or maturity of particular policing capabilities. This type of capability insight is of practical value to adversaries who routinely adapt their behaviour to exploit perceived weaknesses, overwhelm less technologically equipped forces, or adjust methods to avoid detection. Even a single confirmation or denial could be combined with publicly available information from other forces to build a detailed national picture of capability. This mosaic effect represents a realistic and actionable risk, providing information that could materially undermine national security and the effectiveness of law‑enforcement operations.
Public Interest Test – Section 24(2) National Security
Factors in favour of confirming or denying - There is a strong public interest in openness and transparency about the use of AI in policing. Confirming or denying the existence of information could contribute to informed public debate about how emerging technologies are deployed, the safeguards in place, and whether they align with legal and ethical standards. Disclosure can enhance accountability, promote trust, and reassure the public that AI use is subject to appropriate oversight.
Factors against confirming or denying - There is an overriding public interest in protecting national security. Confirming or denying the existence of information about AI deployment in CT, SoC, covert intelligence, or linked specialist forensics would provide adversaries with useful insights into operational capabilities and priorities. Even a simple confirmation or denial could enable hostile actors to adjust methods, exploit potential gaps, or test thresholds. The resulting risk to national security would be real and more than trivial, and is not mitigated by partial or local confirmations, because the cumulative mosaic effect across multiple forces would still disclose sensitive capability at a national level.
Public Interest Test – Section 31(3) Law Enforcement
Factors in favour of confirming or denying - There is a general public interest in understanding how AI is used to support policing functions, including the efficiency and effectiveness of core processes, and in ensuring that novel technologies are used lawfully and proportionately. Confirmation or denial could support external scrutiny and promote confidence in policing practice.
Factors against confirming or denying - Confirming or denying the existence of information relating to AI use in CT, SoC, covert intelligence, or specialist digital forensics would be likely to prejudice the prevention and detection of crime, the apprehension or prosecution of offenders, and the operation of law enforcement tactics and methodologies. Knowledge of whether specific capabilities exist, or do not exist, enables offenders to adapt behaviour, exploit capability gaps, frustrate investigations, and increase the cost and complexity of counter‑measures. The public interest strongly favours maintaining an NCND to preserve the effectiveness of law enforcement and the safety of the public.
Balance Test
For the reasons set out above, South Wales Police will neither confirm nor deny whether it holds information indicating AI is used in CT, SoC, covert intelligence activity, or specialist digital forensics supporting those functions.
The public interest in maintaining the NCND position under sections 24(2) and 31(3) outweighs the public interest in confirmation or denial.
This response should not be taken as an indication of whether or not any further relevant information is held.